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ABSTRACT 
The United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) was 
established in October 2007 to encompass all U.S. operations 
on the African continent under one unified command.  Several 
African nations have a history of chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear operations, while most countries 
have a history of use as dumping grounds for hazardous 
materials and toxic industrial materials.  Africa has also 
suffered extreme environmental degradation due to these and 
other causes.  The U.S Army Chemical Corps has increased its 
capabilities to include not only chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear operations, but all hazardous 
material, toxic industrial material, and environmental 
operations for the U.S. Army.  The Chemical Corps has also 
increased capabilities for disaster and crisis response and 
management since September 11, 2001, and utilized some of 
those capabilities during Hurricane Katrina.   
One of AFRICOM’s primary goals is to build partner 
capacity so that African governments can provide security 
and respond in times of need.  The Chemical Corps can assist 
with the realization of these goals.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE CHEMICAL CORPS AND AFRICOM 
United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) represents a new 
Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), designed to focus on 
Africa and take over the missions of the European Command 
(EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), and Central Command 
(CENTCOM) on the continent.  AFRICOM has been created 
quickly in the last two years to bring all U.S. operations 
on the continent together under one unified command.  
Several African countries have a history of chemical, 
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) access, 
research, development, and/or use.  Africa also has 
potential for non-traditional operations by the Chemical 
Corps including training for cleanup and storage of 
hazardous materials (HAZMAT) and toxic industrial materials 
(TIM), and natural disaster response.  This thesis aims to 
provide guidance for the Chemical Corps with regard to 
activities and trends to watch for, based on historical 
events in Africa and the Corps’ current and future 
abilities.    
B. U.S. CHEMICAL CORPS HISTORY 
The Chemical Corps, originally named the Chemical 
Warfare Service (CWS), was established by the War Department 
in 1918 in response to the use of chlorine gas in the 
trenches during World War I.  Congress made the CWS a 
permanent branch of the Army in 1920 on the premise that 
chemical warfare was a likely threat in any future conflict. 
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The CWS was intended to manage chemical warfare 
programs for the U.S. military, both offensive and 
defensive.  In the years between World War I and World War 
II, the CWS developed both a strong offensive capability and 
an effective defensive posture.  During that time, the CWS 
expanded its capabilities to include the 4.2-inch chemical 
mortar and smoke generators, capable of delivering smoke and 
high explosive munitions in support of combat missions.  The 
CWS also introduced a variety of flame and incendiary 
weapons systems during that time.  In 1942, the CWS added 
biological developments to its list of responsibilities and 
in 1946 was redesignated the Chemical Corps.  In 1949, the 
Chemical Corps added research and development 
responsibilities for radiological warfare. 
During the Korean War, the Chemical Corps conducted the 
longest continuous smoke screen mission — protecting troop 
movement in Artillery Valley for 14 months.  The 4.2-inch 
Chemical Mortar battalions also conducted extensive combat 
operations.  The mortar capability was transferred to the 
infantry in 1953.  
The Vietnam War saw the Chemical Corps develop and 
introduce aerial “people sniffers” to find the enemy.  It 
also introduced thickened fuel flame devices (napalm) to 
protect firebases, herbicides to clear fields of fire, and 
tear gas to keep both the enemy at bay and crowds under 
control.  Following the war, there was some discussion about 
deactivating the Chemical Corps, but the ensuing Cold War 
kept the Corps active. 
In 1972, the United States renounced the use of 
biological weapons and, in 1997, the use of chemical 
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weapons.  Despite the U.S. promise to not use these weapons 
offensively, a defensive need kept the Chemical Corps an 
active branch of the Army. 
In 1991, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 
found the Corps protecting the forces against a chemically 
and biologically well-armed adversary.  Beginning with the 
terrorist attacks on U.S. soil on September 11, 2001, and 
the October 2001 anthrax attacks, the Chemical Corps 
expanded its responsibilities to include protecting the 
homeland with the introduction of Civil Support Teams, 
conducting sensitive site exploitation, and maintaining an 
ever-evolving protective stance.  Chemical Soldiers and 
units have been active participants in every stage and phase 
of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom 
(Afghanistan).  The variety of missions they have conducted 
range from traditional missions to hazardous material and 
toxic industrial material clean-up and storage, and even 
duties outside of their scope of operations, such as convoy 
escort and detainee operations.1 
C. CAPABILITIES OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS 
The Chemical Corps has a long history of evolving 
missions.  In what follows these will be separated and 
discussed as “traditional” and “non-traditional” missions.  
 Capabilities include chemical, biological, and 
radiological (CBR) reconnaissance and detection, 
decontamination, defensive smoke and flame operations, Civil 
                     
1 U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear School, “U.S. 
Army Chemical Corps History,” History, 
http://www.wood.army.mil/cbrns/history.html (accessed February 28, 
2009). 
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Support, sensitive site exploitation, technical escort 
capabilities, clean-up and storage of hazardous materials 
(HAZMAT) and toxic industrial materials (TIM), and 
environmental protection. 
1. Traditional CBRN Operations  
The traditional duties of the Chemical Corps include 
counter-proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, 
and nuclear weapons.  These operations include four core 
capabilities, most of which are Chemical Corps - specific, 
although they are designed to be incorporated into all 
branches of the Department of Defense (DoD) and across the 
U.S. Government’s (USG) efforts to combat proliferation.  
The four capabilities are counterforce, active defense, 
passive defense, and consequence management.2  
a. Counterforce 
Personnel conducting counterforce operations 
attack adversary CBRN weapons and their associated 
production, transportation, and storage facilities before 
they can be used in order to reduce the CBRN threat to 
friendly operations and interests.3  Special Forces and 
other combat arms branches of the military would assist with 
conducting these types of operations. 
                     
2 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11: Multiservice Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense 
Operations (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA: 
2003), I-3.  
3 Ibid. 
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b. Active Defense 
The branches of service conducting active defense 
intercept conventional and unconventional CBRN delivery 
means – whether through air defense or active ground 
defense.  Together, counterforce operations and active 
defense reduce the burden on passive-defense measures.4  Air 
Defense Artillery and the Air Force primarily conduct the 
air defense operations, while all branches of the Department 
of Defense conduct active ground defense. 
c. Passive Defense 
Passive defense protects personnel from the 
effects of a CBRN attack and allows sustained operations.  
The elements of passive defense include; contamination 
avoidance, protection, and decontamination.  This comprises 
the bulk of what the Chemical Corps does and can do in 
either a military or a civilian scenario.5 
Contamination Avoidance—Includes measures taken to 
avoid or minimize CBRN attacks and reduce the effects of 
CBRN hazards.  Contamination avoidance includes 
contamination detection and identification, CBRN 
reconnaissance, mitigating contamination, intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield (mapping potential target 
areas and primary decontamination locations, etc.), 
vulnerability assessments, and hazard prediction.6  
                     
4 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11: Multiservice Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures, I-3-4. 
5 Ibid., I-4. 
6 Ibid., II-2-6. 
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Protection—There are several protective measures: 
individual protection, reaction to attack, and the use of 
collective protection.  The techniques used for avoidance 
also provide protection.7  While the use of collective 
protection requires equipment which is most likely not 
available to everyday citizens, there are some measures 
everyday civilians can utilize.  These are discussed in the 
recommendations section of the Conclusion.    
Decontamination (During Hostilities)8—CBRN agent 
contamination should be avoided when possible.  When this is 
not possible, personnel and equipment must be decontaminated 
to reduce or eliminate the risk to personnel and to make 
equipment serviceable.  Decontamination procedures are 
designed to neither degrade the performance of personnel or 
equipment nor harm the environment.  There are four levels 
of decontamination: immediate, operational, thorough, and 
clearance.  These levels of decontamination are graded from 
what is considered a basic necessity (immediate) to total 
(clearance) decontamination with each level increasing the 
requirements needed to conduct the decontamination.9  
While these are the standard forms of 
decontamination during hostile operations, decontamination 
can (and is) also performed during peacetime operations or 
in response to a CBRN attack outside of combat operations.  
For instance, in the case of the massive anthrax attack in 
                     
7 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11: Multiservice Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures, II-7. 
8 Ibid., II-12. 
9 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11.5: Multiservice 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, and Nuclear Decontamination (US Army Training and Doctrine 
Command, Fort Monroe, VA: 2006), I-2. 
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October 2001 on the Hart Senate Building in Washington, 
D.C., Captain Lindsey Nagtzaam enumerates four doctrinal 
decontamination principles: 
• Decontaminate as soon as possible 
• Decontaminate only what is necessary 
• Decontaminate as far forward as possible 
• Decontaminate by priority10 
In 2007, Ardent Sentry was a mass casualty 
simulation scenario in which a terrorist detonated a nuclear 
device in Indiana.  The scenario involved the Department of 
Defense, Indiana Department of Homeland Security, and 
Indianapolis Department of Public Safety, as well as several 
other governmental organizations and non-governmental 
organizations.  In light of this exercise, these groups 
realized the need for set communication lines and 
coordination among the groups in order to properly respond 
to any such scenario.  The groups also discovered 
differences in decontamination techniques among the 
organizations and agencies and identified additional gaps in 
readiness.  Some of the area requiring further work were: 
• Personnel to be decontaminated 
• Multi-site operations 
• Integration of decontamination operations 
with other plans 
• Disposition of runoff 
• Disposition of personal effects 
• Accountability 
• Crowd control operations11 
                     
10 Lindsay Nagtzaam, “Anthrax Decontamination,” Army Chemical Review, 
January 2003.  
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d. Consequence Management 
Consequence management includes measures to 
provide emergency assistance to civilian authorities when 
directed by the chain of command.  Consequence management 
measures could be required during any phase of operations, 
depending on the threat and availability of assets.12 
Emergency assistance could include the eight military 
mission areas, from the “National Military Strategy to 
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction”: 
• Security cooperation and partner activities 
• Threat reduction cooperation 
• Interdiction operations 
• Offensive operations 
• Elimination operations 
• Active defense 
• Passive defense 
• Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence 
management13 
The reorganization and redevelopment of the 
Chemical Corps in the past few years in accordance with the 
Modular Army concept has enabled the Corps to better conduct 
consequence management.  The CBRNE14 Company Team is a new 
structure brought about by the reorganization.   
                     
11 Michael L. Snyder and Thomas J. Sobieski, “Decontamination 
Operations in a Mass Casualty Scenario: Observations from Ardent Sentry 
2007,” Army Chemical Review, Summer 2008, 10-15.  
12 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11: Multiservice 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, I-4. 
13 Pete Lofy, “CBRNE CO TMs in Support of WMD-E Operations,” Army 
Chemical Review, Winter 2008, 5-8. 
14 The E in CBRNE stands for high-yield explosives, which are 
included when an Explosive Ordnance Demolitions (EOD) asset is added to 
a CBRN unit. 
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…there are four basic components of each CBRNE 
Company Team – a company headquarters (Tech 
Escort (TE), Explosive Ordnance Demolitions 
(EOD), or conventional CBRN) for command and 
control and limited sustainment: chemical, 
biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield 
explosive response team (CRT); EOD team (three 
EOD Soldiers); and a “specialized” 
decontamination platoon.  These decontamination 
platoons [are] outfitted with and trained on the 
equipment set contained in hazard response 
platoons currently serving in Iraq.15 
This new organization increases the capacity for 
operations during both peacetime and combat.  CBRNE Company 
Teams are able to respond to a variety of situations with 
specific expertise and standard operating procedures without 
the need for additional Chemical units.  In a situation 
where the sheer size of the operation requires additional 
resources, the CBRNE Company Team has the requisite 
knowledge to maintain command and control of the operation.   
2. Non-Traditional Operations and Capabilities 
The non-traditional operations and capabilities of the 
Chemical Corps include Civil Support Teams, Sensitive Site 
Exploitation, HAZMAT operations, storage of toxic chemicals, 
toxic industrial material response, decontamination 
following natural disasters, and environmental protection.   
a. Civil Support Teams  
Catastrophic national crises such as the terrorist 
bombings in both New York City and Oklahoma City in the 
1990s, and then the events of September 11, and the anthrax 
                     
15 Lofy, “CBRNE CO TMs in Support,” 5-8. 
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attacks of 2001 have led to improvements in our national 
response, culminating with the creation of the first Weapons 
of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST) in 
1998.16   
The WMD-CSTs are response teams designed to assist 
civil authorities at domestic CBRNE incident sites by 
“identifying CBRNE agents and substances, assessing current 
and projected consequences, advising on response measures, 
and assisting with appropriate requests for additional 
support.”17  Title 10 US Code and/or Title 32 US Code status 
allow the teams to operate throughout the United States, its 
territories, and possessions.  As a resource for state 
governors, the CSTs can be directed to respond to the 
intentional or unintentional release of CBRNE and natural or 
man-made disasters in the United States.  The teams are 
highly trained and can coordinate across government agencies 
to effectively respond to and deal with the consequences 
following a crisis.18 
The 2nd WMD-CST was one of the first units to 
conduct air sampling after the attack on the World Trade 
Center in 2001.  Already well-networked with local and city 
authorities, the team provided a vital role in ensuring the 
safety of the responding emergency services.  The team 
brought with it a mobile lab, mobile communications center, 
and HAZMAT support for the search and rescue teams.  The 
mobile lab can test any suspect liquid, solid, or air 
                     
16 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-11.22: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction – Civil Support Teams (Washington, DC: 2007), 1-1. 
17 Ibid., V. 
18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 3-11.22: Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, 1-1. 
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samples for chemical or biological substances down to parts 
per billion, as well as do rapid DNA sampling and chemical 
analysis to identify potential toxic substances.  The FBI, 
upon the destruction of its communications equipment when 
the towers fell, utilized the 2nd WMD-CST’s mobile 
communications center (Unified Command Suite).19  That 
communications center directed a majority of the coordinated 
efforts at Ground Zero, indicating the scope of the CST’s 
capabilities.  By April 10, 2002, the 2nd WMD-CST from New 
York had been called to respond more than 38 times just 
since September 11, 2001.  Frequently, the unit was 
requested to be on site at large public events, such as the 
NYC marathon, baseball playoffs, and the World Series – all 
attractive terrorist targets for a CBRNE attack.   
b. Sensitive Site Exploitation 
A sensitive site, as defined by the military 
manual Special Text (ST) 3-90.15, Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive 
Sites, is “… a geographically limited area with special 
diplomatic, informational, military, or economic sensitivity 
to the United States.”20  To the Chemical Corps, a sensitive 
site is any site that could include stored WMD or a facility 
used to produce or test them.   
                     
19 Kathleen T. Rhem, “Team Hears ‘We’ve Been Waiting For You’ When 
Public Safety’s at Risk,” American Forces Press Service News Articles, 
April 10, 2002, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=44181 (accessed 
March 13, 2009). 
20 ST 3-90.15, December 2002, in Pete Lofy, “Managing Sensitive Site 
Exploitation – Notes from Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Army Chemical 
Review, September 2003. 
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Sensitive site exploitation has been conducted 
during both Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.  
During those operations, CENTCOM designated sites that were 
associated with WMD as sensitive sites.   
For instance, Task Force Iron Horse from the 4th 
Infantry Division (4ID) at Fort Hood, Texas was assigned the 
task of securing and exploiting many of the sites during its 
deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Task 
Force was responsible for checking out potential sites as 
directed by the 4ID Effects Coordination Cell (ECC).  The 
ECC categorized the sites as either “potentially containing 
WMD” or “not containing WMD” and then prioritized them for 
exploitation.  The Task Force quickly realized that reports 
from the local population regarding “things buried in their 
backyards, fields, or playgrounds” and incorrect 
identification by troops of found munitions could quickly 
overwhelm the unit’s SSE assets which were already in high 
demand.  The lessons learned included a need for a filter 
system and research of each potential site at the lowest 
possible level before requesting the Task Force SSE assets.  
This significantly reduced the strain on the sensitive site 
teams.  The local unit would survey the site with its 
organic CBRN teams.  Only with positive results would they 
request the support of the Fox M93A1 Nuclear, Biological, 
and Chemical Reconnaissance System and, with further 
positive results, would then request the support of the Task 
Force SSE assets.21 
                     
21 Pete Lofy, “Managing Sensitive Site Exploitation – Notes from 
Operation Iraqi Freedom,” Army Chemical Review, September 2003.  Further 
examples and citations of Sensitive Site Exploitation are not available 
in an open-source media.  
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c. HAZMAT Operations 
The U.S. Army is not the only branch of the 
government that conducts HAZMAT or CBRN operations.  The 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 established the 
National Strike Force (NSF) as a rapidly deployable resource 
for hazardous material (HAZMAT), petroleum, and biochemical 
response.  The NSF is part of the existing National Response 
System – a network of federal, state, and local agencies 
that prepare for and respond to oil and hazardous substance 
releases, including chemical and biological terrorism 
incidents.  The Coast Guard is a traditional member of the 
NSF and has trained with the Chemical Corps on HAZMAT and 
CBRN operations, each benefit from the other’s extensive 
knowledge of their respective specialties.22 
In June 2007, an Iraqi Army patrol and its 
American advisors (members of a Military Transition Team) 
discovered several thousand five-gallon containers of nitric 
acid – an extremely corrosive, toxic industrial chemical 
associated with bomb making.  This led to the largest HAZMAT 
remediation mission undertaken during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  The mission was dubbed Operation Dragon’s Den, and 
included using sand and caustic soda to neutralize and 
absorb large puddles of the nitric acid before packing it 
into overpack containers (large drums capable of storing 
hazardous materials) for movement to the HAZMAT yard on Camp 
Fallujah.  The operation also required significant 
decontamination operations for the personnel and equipment 
                     
22 Dennis E. Branson and Jaime Bigelow, “The Chemical Corps and the 
Coast Guard – Interoperability in Action,” Army Chemical Review, January 
2003. 
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conducting the cleanup.  This operation included CBRN 
Soldiers and Marines, Marine and Iraqi Firefighters, and 
environmental representatives from several organizations.23 
d. Storage of Toxic Chemicals 
The Chemical Corps first began storage operations 
of chemical munitions in the early 1960s.  After a series of 
national policy changes in the 1980s, the focus changed from 
stockpiling the munitions to safely storing them until they 
could be demilitarized.  The U.S. Army Chemical Materials 
Agency (CMA) is responsible for the seven locations where 
munitions are currently stockpiled as demilitarization 
continues.  For instance, at the Anniston Chemical Activity 
(ANCA) in the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) in Alabama the 
stockpiles include: rockets, artillery shells, mortars, land 
mines, ton containers (for storing bulk supplies of agent), 
the nerve agents sarin (GB) and VX, and sulfur mustard 
blister agents (H, HD, and HT).  This facility has safely 
destroyed 142,428 rockets and artillery shells and 96,246 
gallons of liquid GB (Phase 1), 26,491 M55 rockets and 
30,301 gallons of liquid VX (Phase 2, which includes the VX 
filled artillery shells and land mines, scheduled for 
disposal next).  In its final phase of operations ANCA will 
dispose of mustard agent artillery shells, mortars, and bulk 





                     
23 Vasili Karatzas and Alejandro Ibarra, “Operation Dragon’s Den,” 
Army Chemical Review, Winter 2008, 12-15. 
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9.5 million safe man-hours of operations and will be 
decommissioned at the end of the demilitarization 
operations.24 
e. Toxic Industrial Material (TIM) 
Experiences with the 1984 chemical release at 
Bhopal, India, and the 1986 nuclear contamination release at 
Chernobyl, Ukraine, demonstrate that toxic industrial 
materials can pose as many hazards as military weapons.  A 
release other than attack, whether intentional or due to 
collateral damage, presents a potential challenge for our 
forces.25   
For the purposes of this thesis, TIM incidents are 
treated as non-traditional operations.  A shift in training 
focus has been advocated by chemical officers for the last 
several years to include TIM/HAZMAT training at the 
schoolhouse based on the prevalence of those types of 
scenarios in the Global War on Terror.  While traditional 
CBRN weapons are glorified for their ability to produce mass 
casualties, our most likely adversaries (a state- or non-
state sponsored actor) will not have access to them. 
However, they will have access to the means for creative 
attacks using toxic industrial materials.26 
                     
24 Michael B. Abrams, “Anniston Chemical Activity Stores and 
Demilitarizes Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Army Chemical Review, 
January-June 2007, 43-44. 
25 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11.3: Multiservice 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, I-2. 
26 James Demyanovich, “The U.S. Army Chemical Corps- An Expansion in 
Skills and Equipment is Needed to Support Response to TIM/HAZMAT Release 
Incidents,” Army Chemical Review, April 2004, 1. 
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In 2003, the Commandant of the Chemical Corps 
added training on TIM/HAZMAT events to the Chemical School 
curriculum.  This addition illustrates concern over the 
importance and likely future prevalence of these events. 
TIM hazards, previously considered insignificant 
during wartime, increase greatly in significance 
when manufactured, stored, distributed, or 
transported in close proximity to fixed sites, 
ports, or airfields.  Deliberate or inadvertent 
release significantly increases hazards to the 
indigenous population and U.S. forces…TIM are 
generally classified in one of the following 
categories: 
• Agricultural—includes insecticides, herbicides, 
and fertilizers 
• Industrial—chemical and radiological materials 
used in manufacturing processes, in fuel, or in 
cleaning 
• Production and research—chemicals and biological 
materials produced or stored in a facility 
• Radiological—nuclear power plants, medical 
facilities, and laboratories27 
But, they can also include less conventional sites 
and sources: 
• Clandestine, illegal drug-manufacturing sites 
• Lakes with runoff from industrial complexes 
• Bodies of water or land suspected of sabotage 
• Debris from cargo aircraft, truck, car, or 
railroad accidents 
• Illegal toxic waste sites found on 
battlefields 
• Large industrial spills found along avenues 
of commerce transportation28 
                     
27 U.S. Army Chemical School (USACMLS), FM 3-11: Multiservice 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, I-8. 
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TIM contaminated areas can also include those 
devastated by natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, 
or terrorist attacks such as September 11th.   
f. Decontamination Following Natural Disasters 
Floods and receding waters after hurricanes, 
typhoons, dam breaks, etc, can create TIM and HAZMAT events.  
In order for the affected populations to continue life in an 
affected area, decontamination must be performed.  We saw 
this quite vividly with Hurricane Katrina in the United 
States in 2005.  
In fact, Hurricane Katrina initiated the first 
decontamination operation of its type by troops in an urban 
situation.  In order to keep up with the demand for 
decontamination operations, the Paratroopers from the 21st 
Chemical Company (Airborne) had to conduct continuous 
operations for eight days until the water receded enough for 
the unit to close its decontamination site.29   
g. Environmental Protection 
Whereas formerly the military has been accused of 
contributing to environmental pollution, today it is far 
likelier to work to help clean it up.  This is especially 
true of land around military installations and training 
areas.   
For instance, according to a national water 
quality assessment conducted between 1992 and 1999 by the 
                     
28 Gene Weinreis, “The Warrior Scientist: Preparing Today for Victory 
on Tomorrow’s Battlefield,” Army Chemical Review, Winter 2007, 20. 
29 Aimee Hemery, “The 21st Chemical Company Provides Aid in New 
Orleans,” Army Chemical Review, January-June 2007, 8-10. 
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U.S. Geological Survey, 70 percent of domestic and public 
wells contain at least one form of chlorinated solvent, 
nitrate, or pesticide and 47 percent contain at least two 
compounds.  Dry cleaning agents, engine degreasers, and 
paint removers have not only polluted the nation’s 
groundwater but also represents one of the largest 
remediation liabilities for the Department of Defense.30   
The Tarheel Army Missile Plant in Burlington, 
North Carolina, a former Army-owned and contractor-operated 
facility from the 1950s, pioneered the first remediation 
program for chlorinated solvent cleanup.  This new technique 
is better, faster and cheaper than all previous techniques 
and uses Emulsified Oil Substrate (a food-grade soybean oil 
solution).  The solution is diluted and “injected into the 
aquifer and then followed with chase water to distribute and 
immobilize the oil droplets.  Once in the subsurface, the 
food grade substrates biodegrade, consuming dissolved oxygen 
and releasing hydrogen to stimulate reductive 
dechlorination.”31  Testing within weeks after the injection 
revealed that the chlorination had decreased by 99 percent 
and has remained low.32 
That is one sort of remediation the Chemical Corps 
has learned to perform well.  A second example is Task Force 
Environmental Cleanup.  In late April 2003, the 2nd Brigade 
Combat Team from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) 
discovered extensive chemical dumping from a looted 
agricultural storage facility in central Mosul, Iraq.  The 
                     
30 Ira May and Jean Skillman, “New Technology Helps Mother Nature 
Expedite Cleanups,” Army Chemical Review, July-December 2005, 14. 
31 Ibid., 15. 
32 Ibid., 16. 
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Division Chemical section quickly organized Task Force 
Environmental Cleanup to combat the more than 11,000 gallons 
of assorted chemicals that were deliberately poured on the 
ground and streets of this Mosul neighborhood.  When the 
initial site survey team arrived to assess the situation, it 
discovered children vomiting and found many dead animals, 
including more than 20 dead pigeons.  It also found that the 
local populace refused to evacuate their homes for fear they 
would be looted in their absence.  In order to contain the 
immediate threat, 2nd Platoon of the 63rd Chemical Company 
(Smoke/Decontamination) conducted a complete terrain 
decontamination of the effected grounds and the warehouses, 
then capped the sites with approximately 120 tons of dirt.  
After repeated testing for vapor hazards (which posed the 
most immediate and serious threat to the local populace) the 
area was deemed safe.  Further plans were made to remove and 
dispose of the contaminated soil.33   
                     
33 Brian Lynch, “Task Force Environmental Cleanup,” Army Chemical 
Review, September 2003. 
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II. THE CREATION OF AFRICOM AND CHALLENGES IN 
AFRICA 
The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was created to 
combine and take over programs previously run by the U.S. 
Pacific Command (PACOM), the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), 
and the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on the African 
continent.  All three had prior responsibility for 
maintaining relationships with countries in Africa, but none 
had responsibility for coordination of those efforts and 
their programs. 
The creation of U.S. Africa Command enables [the 
Department of Defense] to better focus its 
resources to support and enhance existing U.S. 
initiatives that help African nations, the 
African Union, and the regional economic 
communities succeed.  It also provides African 
nations and regional organizations an integrated 
[Department of Defense] coordination point to 
help address security and related needs.34 
A. THE CHEMICAL CORPS AND THE GEOGRAPHIC COMBATANT 
COMMANDS 
CENTCOM’s Area of Focus (AOF) includes both wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  As we have seen, during those wars 
the Chemical Corps has conducted limited traditional 
operations, but significant non-traditional operations as 
referenced in the previous chapter.  
Throughout the Cold War, Chemical units in EUCOM 
maintained readiness in the event of a CBRN attack from the 
Soviet Bloc.  Chemical units were responsible for 
                     
34 United States Africa Command, “About US AFRICOM,” Africom.mil, 
http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp (accessed March 6, 2009).  
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traditional operations throughout the Cold War, and since 
the end of the Cold War have assisted in more non-
traditional operations such as HAZMAT operations, 
environmental clean-up and protection.   
As for operations in PACOM, Chemical Corps historians 
mostly describe traditional operations associated with the 
Korean and Vietnam Wars.  During the Korean War, the Corps 
ran smoke and mortar missions.  During the Vietnam War the 
Corps developed and used aerial "people sniffers" to find 
the enemy, thickened fuel flame devices to protect 
firebases, developed herbicides to clear fields of fire and 
tear gas to restrict the enemy and control crowds.35  
Currently, there are no open-source references 
concerning CBRNE operations undertaken by CENTCOM, EUCOM, 
PACOM in Africa.  
B. TRADITIONAL CBRN EVENTS IN AFRICA 
As for CBRN events in Africa, Appendix A offers a 
chronological list spanning the last 60 years.  These events 
do not seem to reveal any particular trends, as they include 
the use of poison, acid, tear gas, biological agents, 
explosives, and fire.  The only pertinent generalization 
that can be made is that CBRN events seem to be centered in 
specific conflict zones and relate to what is locally 
available by way of material and components.   
                     
35 U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear School, 
“U.S. Army Chemical Corps History,” History,  
http://www.wood.army.mil/cbrns/history.html (accessed February 17, 
2009). 
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C. NON-TRADITIONAL CBRN EVENTS IN AFRICA 
In contrast, non-traditional CBRN events do point to 
certain discernable trends.  Non-traditional CBRN events can 
include oil spills, toxic industrial material releases, and 
refining and mining byproducts.  The pollution charges from 
environmental watch-groups against corporations are too 
numerous to list, but all contribute to a significant amount 
of damage done to the land and peoples of Africa. 
Considering that there are abundant resources available 
in Africa, along with inexpensive labor, and few 
environmental controls there is almost limitless potential 
for abuse.  Several negative environmental trends are 
readily detectable across Africa, including (in order of 
prevalence): deforestation, erosion, drought, 
desertification, potable water scarcity, raw sewage 
pollution, poaching, overgrazing, oil/industrial water 
pollution, silt pollution, and flooding.  Appendix B lists 
African countries along with their resource and 
environmental issues.  Of those issues, this thesis now 
turns to several that the Chemical Corps either has the 
current capability, or could develop the capability, to 
assist with.   
1. Oil and Industrial Pollution 
The River Niger’s Delta region in southern 
Nigeria (West Africa) is the major oil-producing 
area of sub-Saharan Africa, with a crude oil 
production of 2.04 [million barrels per day].  
This region has been environmentally altered in 
the last 40 years by the oil industry boom.  It 
is calculated that over 95% of the former 
rainforest has now disappeared, and that over 
5800 km of oil pipelines have been built 
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throughout the Delta since 1958, many of which 
have been repeatedly broken, causing catastrophic 
oil spillages.  For instance, between 1986 and 
1996 there were 2796 cases of oil spills in this 
region, totaling about 2,500,000 barrels of oil 
spread across the natural environment.36 
a. The Curse of the World’s Most Valuable 
Resource 
The discovery of oil brings money, power, and 
international assistance.  Oil also brings with it 
destruction, poverty, war, corruption, and environmental 
devastation.   
Communities along the Niger Delta have lived off 
subsistence fishing and agriculture for decades.  Neither of 
those food sources are viable when an oil spill occurs.   
The waterways and mangroves are blanketed in 
thick brown sludge that goes on for miles.  
Toxicity overpowers the air and a sense of 
lifelessness pervades the landscape.  Many say it 
will take 10-15 years for the area to be free of 
contamination – if the cleanup effort commences 
in a timely manner.37 
Oil has consistently proven a curse for a majority 
of Nigerians.  Since the 1970s, the United Nations estimates 




                     
36 L. Luiselli and others, “Home range area may vary considerably in 
relation to habitat contamination in two African terrapins from pristine 
and oil polluted habitats,” Amphibia-Reptilia 27 (2006): 255. 
37 Ling, “World’s Most Valuable Resource.”  
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Delta.38  Despite this vast number, there is little 
international outrage and seldom are the spills reported, 
even in Nigeria.39   
As of 2007, there are over 606 oil fields.40  
Despite the fact that oil revenues have transformed the 
Nigerian economy, the Niger Delta region itself remains the 
most underdeveloped and backward in Nigeria in terms of 
human capital, industrial infrastructure, and basic social 
services.  This backwardness “has been exacerbated by 
environmental degradation and pollution by oil firms that 
have turned farmlands into wastelands.  Loss of farmlands 
means loss of income and source of livelihood and 
sustenance.  The region is a classic case of blatant neglect 
in the midst of its phenomenal oil wealth.”41  Not only do 
oil spills damage the land, making it unusable for farming, 
but they also kill the marine life, devastating the 
communities that depend on subsistence fishing.       
While pollution is one of many secondary or even 
tertiary effects of oil exploration, other effects include: 
logging to clear areas for pipelines, tank farms, and other 
oil activities; gas flaring – known to be responsible for 
acid rain; sabotage by locals who feel cheated of the 
benefits from extraction of resources on their land; erosion 
due to deforestation; and low-yield crops from contaminated 
soil. 
                     
38 Ling, “World’s Most Valuable Resource.”  
39 Ibid. 
40 Felix M. Edoho, “Oil Transnational Corporations: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability,” Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management 15, no.4 (2007): 216. 
41 Ibid. 
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2. Floods and other Natural Disasters  
Portions of the African continent repetitively 
experience floods and droughts.  Several countries are 
particularly prone to these cycles: South Africa, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Malawi, Zambia, and Namibia.  For example, in 
2001, 7000 people died in floods in Mozambique.  In 2007, 
over 50 deaths were recorded, while in 2008 there were less 
than a dozen fatalities.42  Nevertheless, all these floods 
destroyed tree crops, inundated crops, ruined forests, 
destroyed villages, and created repeat humanitarian crises. 
a. Contaminating the Water-table 
Flooding typically contaminates the water-table; 
increases waterborne diseases; assists in spreading other 
diseases such as malaria, cholera, dysentery, and 
tuberculosis; and spreads pollution across a greater area.  
Almost half of Africa’s countries cite water contamination 
from silt, raw sewage, or oil/industrial pollution.  Even 
more claim their available water is not safe for drinking.  
Several nations also report that they have little-to-no 
fresh water access, potable or otherwise.43   
                     
42 “More Floods, Drought in Africa,” news24.com, September 7, 2008,  
http://www.news24.com/News24/Technology/News/0,,2-13-
1443_2354550,00.html (accessed March 6, 2009). 
43 CIA, The World Factbook (2009), 
https://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bn.html#Geo 
(accessed March 14, 2009). 
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3. Dumping 
a. “Donated” Insecticides 
There have been several instances of toxic dumping 
masked by the perpetrators as international aid.  Many 
nations use Africa as an inexpensive dumping ground, 
promising assistance with the acceptance of their toxic 
waste.  In one documented case, the government of Niger sent 
a shipment of the toxic chemical dieldrin back to the 
Netherlands.  The chemical had originally been “donated” to 
Niger as a pest control product and, when it proved 
ineffective against insects, the government realized it had 
been duped.  Countries have also been known to try to bribe 
recipients into accepting toxic waste.  For example, Japan 
donated Toyota trucks to Benin provided Benin also accept 
shipments of highly toxic chemicals.   
Many times the ‘donated’ pesticides cannot be used 
since they are ineffective.  Stored improperly, they leak 
into the water-table and poison some of the little available 
water.  To make matters worse, several international 
organizations, both aid organizations and chemical 
corporations, are working together on plans for incineration 
facilities within Africa, which would in effect keep the 
chemical donations coming.  Once incinerated, the chemicals 
would become toxic emissions and poisonous ash, further 
destroying the African environment.44 
                     
44 Holley Knaus, “Return to Sender,” The Multinational Monitor 12, 
no. 9 (1991), 
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1991/09/lines.html 
(accessed January 19, 2009). 
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In late 2006, tons of toxic chemicals were 
illegally dumped around the Cote d’Ivoire port city of 
Abidjan when the trucks transporting them were denied access 
to the local dump due to their fumes.  The waste had 
originated aboard a ship that had picked up a load of low-
grade gasoline and then refined it, creating a by-product of 
toxic waste.  Typical procedures dictate that upon delivery 
of the gasoline to their destination, the ship’s waste tanks 
must be cleaned out to the tune of $300,000 in Europe or 
$12,000 in Africa.  What is done with the waste is up to the 
company that agrees to clean out the tanks.  The shipment of 
gas arrived in Cote d’Ivoire and, upon emptying the tanks 
and beginning the process of transporting the waste to the 
dump, locals living near the dump barricaded the entrances 
forcing the trucks to go elsewhere, at which point they 
began dumping around the city, or just abandoned the full 
trucks on the side of the road.  The dumping led to reports 
of thousands of people suffering from vomiting, diarrhea, 
and nosebleeds.45 
b. “Donated” E-Waste 
A looming problem presents itself with the 
donation of used electronics, primarily cell-phones, 
computers and televisions, to developing nations under 
recycling programs.  Regulations state that the donating 
countries are not required to prove that the electronics are 
functional, thereby providing an easy loophole for dumping.  
According to the Basel Action Network, a Seattle-based 
                     
45 Kimberly Johnson, “Toxic Dumping in Africa Elicits Calls for 
Better Controls,” The National Geographic News, October 30, 2006, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/10/061030-toxic-
waste_2.html (accessed January 19, 2009). 
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environmental group, 75 percent of all recycled electronics 
can’t be repaired and end up in landfills and dumps in 
countries such as Nigeria.  One problem with this is that 
most e-waste contains toxic materials such as lead, cadmium, 
and mercury, which leech into the water table.  
Additionally, the popular way to decrease the size of the 
piles of plastic casings is to burn them, releasing multiple 
carcinogens into the environment.  While some profit can be 
gleaned from disassembling the components for scrap metal 
parts and reconstruction of some working electronics, the 
workers who disassemble the parts are the most likely to 
experience carcinogenic effects the soonest, primarily women 
and children.46 
4. Mining and the African Water-table 
There are many metals and minerals in addition to fuels 
extracted in Africa, such as: aluminum, bauxite, copper, 
gold, iron ore, lead, nickel, platinum, zinc, titanium, 
diamonds, phosphate rock, coal, and uranium.47  Many of 
these extractive operations require huge quantities of water 
for processing the products, which then, mixed with 
chemicals, seep back into the water-table.  Erosion and silt 
are by-products of mining that engorge rivers and streams, 
and decrease the capacity to support life.  Tailings (the 
grainy-sludgy residue) from strip-mining are virtually 
                     
46 Ben Harder, “Toxic ‘E-Waste’ Gets Cached in Poor Nations, Report 
Says,” The National Geographic News, November 8, 2005, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/11/1108_051108_electronic_w
aste.html (accessed January 19, 2009); Charles W. Schmidt, “Unfair 
Trade: e-Waste in Africa,” Environmental Health Perspectives 114, no. 4 
(2006), http://www.ehponline.org/members/2006/114-4/spheres.html 
(accessed January 19, 2009). 
47 “Mineral Industry in Africa” Wikipedia.com, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mining_in_Africa (accessed March 6, 2009). 
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devoid of life.  They have no mineral or organic value, so 
using tailings as dirt for planting is out of the question – 
they can also have a high toxin content and contribute to 
acid rock drainage.    
a. Hydropolitics 
Water is essential to the cycle of life.  However, 
on a continent where water is a scarce commodity it takes on 
a life of its own through hydropolitics.  The water issues 
pertaining to four of the most developed nations in Africa – 
South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe - stem from the 
discovery of gold and diamonds in the late 1800s.   
Johannesburg, South Africa, is one of the few 
major cities of the world that does not lie on a river, a 
lake, or a seafront.  When gold was originally discovered, 
the mining process used huge volumes of water for panning to 
find additional gold.  However, a few years later, a more 
precise method was introduced producing higher gold yields.  
This was the McArthur Forester process, which uses cyanide 
to chemically separate the gold from other minerals.48   
Given that the majority of the mining operations 
have occurred along the Witwatersrand Ridge, the 
water table has been substantially reduced due to 
mine dewatering activities.  Water arising from 
mining operations tends to come into contact with 
the residue of the mining operation such as dust, 
exposed reef, and waste rock.  Depending on the 
type of minerals being mined, this water 
dissolves chemical substances in that residue.  
When sulphite ores, particularly those containing 
pyrite (often associated with gold-bearing reef) 
                     
48 Anthony Turton and others, “Gold Scorched Earth and Water: the 
Hydropolitics of Johannesburg,” Water Resources Development 22, no. 2, 
(2006): 319. 
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come into contact with a combination of air and 
water, they give off sulphur dioxide and produce 
low pH waters with a high concentration of iron 
and sulphate.  This process is accelerated by 
specific groups of bacteria that help to 
transform inert sulphides into acidic solutions. 
This problem is of a significant magnitude, 
particularly when mines reach the end of their 
useful lives and are closed, known as acid rock 
drainage.49 
The acid rock drainage ends up in the local water 
supply.  When the entire water supply is connected then the 
entire region is affected.  Livestock, people, and the 
environment in general suffer.  While there are processes to 
clean the water for consumption, they cannot keep up with 
the demand and the poor cannot afford to buy clean water. 
Southern Africa is not the only region of Africa 
where waterways are polluted through mining.  The Pra River 
Basin in Ghana, West Africa has had significant damage from 
the use of metallic mercury to extract gold from crude ore 
since the 4th century.50  The damage comes from the 
processing of ores and disposal of tailings and wastewaters 
around mines, all of which negatively affect the surrounding 
river systems.  
Despite the alarming findings on the negative 
impacts of [metallic mercury] on human health and 
the environment, small-scale gold mining by 
[metallic mercury] amalgamation in gold-rich 
countries of South America, Asia, and Africa is a 
growing and widespread economic activity.  
Therefore, the contamination of soils, sediments, 
water and biota by heavy metals has become a 
                     
49 Anthony Turton and others, “Gold Scorched Earth and Water,” 328. 
50 Augustine K. Donkor and others, “Heavy Metals in Sediments of the 
Gold Mining Impacted Pra River Basin, Ghana, West Africa,” Soil and 
Sediment Contamination 14 (2005): 480. 
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primary concern in these new mining sites because 
of their toxicity, persistence, and accumulation 
in food chains.51 
Lake Victoria in East Africa has been the focus of 
several studies on mercury poisoning and pollution in the 
last 20 years.  The economies surrounding Lake Victoria rely 
on the fisheries and particularly the export of fish to the 
European Union.52  This dependence has stimulated a series 
of studies focusing on mercury levels in the fish and in the 
lake. 53 
Mercury is an element which compounds in systems; 
a plant can assimilate mercury from the ground and, when 
burned, releases the mercury into the atmosphere which in 
turn precipitates into the lake and poisons the fish.  The 
big fish eat the smaller fish, increasing the amount of 
mercury in their systems.  The fish are then caught and 
eaten, which in turn further poisons the people as they are 
also gaining mercury from the plants and water they are 
consuming.   
Globally, 50 percent of the fires seen in 
satellite observations are located in sub-Saharan Africa 
indicating that biomass burnings are another source of 
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potential mercury poisoning of African lakes.54  Soil 
erosion is yet another source of mercury, as it is quickly 
released upon contact with water.55   
5. Mining Uranium and Radiation 
The CIA World Factbook lists sixteen African nations as 
having uranium.  (See Appendix B).  Mining uranium releases 
radioactive gases and dust into the environment, which 
should be closely monitored.  Niger and Namibia are two 
examples of countries that have had populations with 
symptoms of radiation poisoning including lung cancer, 
tuberculosis, and a range of skin diseases.  In one case, at 
the 40-year-old mine in Arlit, Niger it was found that “no 
protection measure was taken for workers, neither protective 
equipment not masks, exposing workers to the deadly gases” 
over the course of 15 to 20 years.56  Locals report that in 
2004 a truck carrying uranium ore was involved in a 
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2005),  http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=54130 (accessed 
March 16, 2009). 
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collision.  The resulting spill on the road was not properly 
cleaned up and one month afterward radiation levels were 
still ten times higher than normal.57  
The statement that “no one cares about Africa” seems to 
have pervaded the business practices of many foreign 
corporations, and even some indigenous corporations, 
operating there.  One testament to the disregard for Africa 
is the lack of attempts to either cover-up or admit to and 
clean up chronic pollution.  It seems that only once a 
watch-group has brought attention to a major problem is it 
even remotely addressed.   
These are precisely the events that the Chemical Corps 
can assist with via remediation. 
D. ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AS A SECURITY THREAT 
Climate change represents the latest in a series 
of environmental drivers of human conflict that 
have been identified in recent decades, following 
others including drought, desertification, land 
degradation, failing water supplies, 
deforestation, fisheries depletion, and even 
ozone depletion … Climate change is now being 
recast as a threat to international peace and 
security; and the region seen as most likely to 
suffer its worst effects is Africa.58 
AFRICOM has already begun programs working with African 
governments to address environmental degradation as a 
security threat.  Efforts are being made by AFRICOM and its 
 
                     
57 The United Nations, “NIGER: Residents of Uranium Mining Town.”  
58 Oli Brown, Anne Hammill, and Robert McLeman, “Climate Change as 
the New Security Threat: Implications for Africa,” International Affairs 
83, no. 6 (2007): 1141. 
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African partners to stabilize conflicted regions with 
consideration for the role that the environment plays in 
stability.  
 36
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III. CHEMICAL CORPS APPLICATION WITHIN AFRICOM 
Given the roles and missions of the Chemical Corps, and 
the issues reviewed here, what might the Chemical Corps do 
in Africa?   
A. AFRICOM’S CURRENT OPERATIONS 
Currently, AFRICOM is conducting several operations in 
which the Chemical Corps can easily acquire an active role. 
First is the State Partnership Program.  As of early 
2009, seven U.S. states’ National Guard units have each 
partnered with an African nation for training, exercises, 
and relationship building.59  The Civil Support Teams are a 
part of the U.S. National Guard, as each state’s WMD 
response team.  With just over fifty Civil Support Teams and 
just over fifty nations in Africa, each team could 
theoretically partner with a country and conduct HAZMAT, 
TIM, and decontamination training.  
Second are disaster preparedness training exercises 
such as “Natural Fire.”60  Natural Fire is a 2009 
multilateral, regional, disaster relief exercise conducted 
with the Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan, Kenyan, and Tanzanian 
militaries in conjunction with AFRICOM’s Army Component, US 
                     
59 United States Africa Command Brief, “State Partnership Program,” 
Africom.mil (March 2009), 
http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/AFRICOM%20Deputies%20Cmb%20Brf%20Industr
y%20Day%202008%2004%2030.pdf (accessed March 16, 2009). 
60 Ibid. 
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Army Africa (USARAF).61  As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the Chemical Corps has several capabilities that 
can be applied to disaster relief operations.  For instance, 
they could conduct decontamination operations for the first 
responders and search and rescue personnel, as they did 
after Hurricane Katrina.  They could also conduct 
reconnaissance of potential TIM contamination sites, due to 
the disaster.  If any TIM contamination sites were found, 
they could conduct cleanup of those sites.  Each of these 
disaster relief capabilities can be cross-trained with the 
Rwandan, Burundian, Ugandan, Kenyan, and Tanzanian 
militaries.  The training could start with train-the-trainer 
instruction at the CBRN Schoolhouse at Fort Leonard Wood, 
Missouri, followed by more in-depth training in-country with 
Mobile Training Teams (MTTs), and then, after military-to-
military training with each individual nation, Natural Fire 
could be the culmination exercise to test everyone’s 
capabilities. 
Third is the Africa Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance (ACOTA) program.  This program trains African 
peacekeepers in, among other things, humanitarian 
operations.  Some of the same capabilities used in the 
disaster preparedness training exercises can be taught to 
humanitarian peacekeepers.  As illustrated by Appendix A, 
occasionally toxins, poisons, and industrial chemicals are 
used against people during conflicts.  The humanitarian 
peacekeepers should have some sort of training in 
neutralization of toxins and protection and decontamination 
                     
61 United States Africa Command: 2009 Posture Statement, “East 
Africa,” Africom.mil March 2009, 
http://www.africom.mil/pdfFiles/USAFRICOM-Posture-Statement-Booklet-
17Mar09-FINAL.pdf (accessed March 25, 2009) 28. 
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of the victims and the peacekeepers assisting the victims.  
Additionally, the Chemical Corps can train peacekeepers in 
water-testing techniques and procedures when new wells are 
drilled as part of humanitarian operations.62   
Finally, the Africa Partnership Station (APS) presents 
a unique opportunity for the Chemical Corps.  It 
incorporates a U.S. Navy ship that sails from port to port 
training military personnel in subject areas such as 
seamanship, search and rescue operations, law enforcement, 
medical readiness, environmental stewardship, and small-boat 
maintenance.  The purpose is to foster partnership and 
collaboration to achieve common goals.63  The Chemical Corps 
could take the lead on environmental stewardship and include 
such areas as environmental clean-up of waterways, 
decontamination of maritime vessels, and CBRN defensive 
training for the ports.  As of 2008, the APS had engaged 15 
West and Central African nations, conducted over 1700 
sessions of courses of instruction, and is comprised of 
professionals from eleven countries, three U.S. services 
(Navy, Marines and Coast Guard), and multiple agencies.64   
Due to concerns regarding toxic industrial chemical 
attack vulnerabilities in South Africa during the 2010 
Soccer World Cup, the government is adding significant WMD 
                     
62 United States Africa Command Brief, “State Partnership Program.” 
63 “Africa Partnership Station,” Africom.mil, 
http://www.c6f.navy.mil/aps_web/index.htm (accessed March 16, 2009). 
64 United States Africa Command, “FACT SHEET: Africa Partnership 
Station,” (Stuttgart, Germany, January 28, 2009), 
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=2510 (accessed March 16, 
2009). 
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response capabilities to the military.65  The Chemical Corps 
could assist with training those capabilities both at the 
CBRN Schoolhouse and with MTTs in South Africa.  Few nations 
in Africa have extensive WMD/HAZMAT/TIM response 
capabilities.  In order to adequately assist with training 
African forces in these areas, a thorough classified 
assessment needs to be done of each nation’s current 
capabilities.  The assessment needs to be classified in 
order to be complete and honest.  This will most accurately 
enable AFRICOM and the Chemical Corps to focus efforts where 
they can be of most help.   
Currently, the Chemical Corps trains officers and 
soldiers from other nations in CBRN operations at the U.S. 
Army CBRN School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.  This 
program could be expanded to include teams from African 
nations that require specific training in a certain area.  
It could involve shadowing a Civil Support Team and train-
the-trainer opportunities. 
B. TRADITIONAL OPERATIONS 
There are several instances of traditional operations 
in which the Chemical Corps can assist with the education 
and training of African militaries and civilian response 
teams for AFRICOM. 
                     
65 “World Cup Could Face CW Threat, South Africa Says,” Global 
Security Newswire, (May 15, 2008),  
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/GSN_20080515_AFE94FC0.php 
(accessed March 27, 2009)   
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1. Passive Defense 
The Chemical Corps can assist countries with 
radiological accountability issues in gaining greater 
security mechanisms to protect and account for their 
radioactive material.  This can include not only the uranium 
that is mined throughout Africa, but other less common 
radioactive sources.   
The Corps can help build on the knowledge of South 
Africans with regard to passive defense against a nuclear 
meltdown at the Koeberg Reactor.  As other nations gain 
interest in acquiring nuclear energy, the training can be 
expanded to include the local populations in those countries 
as well.  
Local police and firefighters can be cross-trained 
on decontamination procedures throughout Africa in order to 
limit exposure during CBRN incidents.  This could be done 
through train-the-trainer training and MTTs at the regional 
level, maybe even at the sub-regional level such as with the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC), and 
appropriate sub-regional entities in East Africa, and the 
Maghreb (North Africa), who could then train local teams.  A 
National Response Task Force can also be set up at the 
regional level to deal with events on a larger scale than 
the local authorities can handle.   
Based on Appendix B, a majority of countries in 
Africa have at least one need for this type of defensive 
training and protection.  That need may not be response 
preparation for an outright attack, but an accidental 
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nuclear meltdown, accidental release of toxic chemicals, or 
reaction to a natural disaster. 
2. Consequence Management 
Consequence management should be taught at all levels 
of government, from the village to the national level.  It 
can include crisis planning and scenarios for the most 
likely events for each region.  Consequence management can 
also include awareness training for the effects of continued 
environmental degradation through soil erosion and soil and 
water contamination.    
3. Non-traditional Operations 
The capacity for non-traditional operation training is 
enormous within Africa, especially since there is a push 
within the Corps toward a wide array of hard-science focused 
missions which no one else is as well equipped to handle.   
a. Civil Support Teams 
A variation on the Civil Support Team can be 
introduced and trained to deal with HAZMAT clean-up and 
storage, and environmental clean-up and protection.  A 
properly trained and equipped Civil Support Team can be the 
first responder to a natural disaster and provide immediate 
support until other agencies can safely arrive.  Countries 
which may have a need for HAZMAT training include: Angola, 
Republic of the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Liberia, 
Malawi, Morocco, Nigeria, Niger, South Africa, Tunisia, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe.   
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Many African countries are chronically afflicted 
with floods.  A Civil Support Team could be a first 
responder and provide immediate decontamination for the 
humanitarian relief workers and governmental agencies 
responding to the flood.  Equipment and training for each 
team would be based on the scenario likelihood for its area.  
The Chemical Corps could conduct further research and 
development into equipment appropriate for the host nation 
for future use. 
b. Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) 
Sensitive site exploitation can be taught to teams 
in the host-nation’s military as well as local and national 
authorities in order to help gain control of any “found” 
radiological materials, and to more effectively contain 
incidents.  SSE skills can help authorities deal with the 
aftermath of non-state actors who may take refuge within 
their borders, and may bring any variety of CBRN/TIM weapons 
with them. 
c. Toxic Industrial Material  
Toxic industrial material handling and storage 
training would be invaluable in Africa.  With adequate 
training, countries could safely clean up environmental 
hazards left by international corporations.  If local 
militaries had this capability and expertise, this would 
demonstrate to citizens that their government cares about 
their well-being. 
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d. Environmental Protection 
The Chemical Corps can help African nations clean 
up water supplies and help provide safe water sources.  
While the actual construction of water-collection devices is 
outside of the realm of CBRN operations, water testing and 
filtration can be conducted by the Chemical Corps.   
e. Storage of Toxic Chemicals 
The Chemical Corps can provide expertise in 
selecting sites for storage of toxic chemicals, safe 
handling practices, and training in neutralization 
techniques.  Cote d’Ivoire and the toxic chemicals dumped 
around the city of Abidjan represent a good example of how 
this training would be useful.  Had the chemicals been 
safely containerized, neutralized, and stored at a pre-
selected site countless people would not have become ill. 
C. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CHEMICAL CORPS FOR 
OPERATIONS IN AFRICA 
As the U.S. Army already trains with the U.S. Navy, 
Coast Guard, Air Force, and Marines in CBRN tactics, 
techniques, and procedures, as well as gleaning other 
Services’ knowledge at the CBRN School, the Corps can 
further put that knowledge to use in finding solutions for 
the plethora of non-traditional challenges to be found in 
Africa.  
Equipment for these operations would have to 
accommodate current resource constraints and sustainability 
issues in Africa.  For example, a water-intensive 
decontamination site would not be useful in an arid nation 
where water is scarce.  
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IV. CONCLUSION 
While the U.S. is not the only country with a Chemical 
Corps, we are the only nation with a Geographic Combatant 
Command centered on Africa.   
Given that a main focus of AFRICOM is to build partner 
capacities the training the Chemical Corps can provide 
should assist the realization of those partner capacities.   
The creation of U.S. Africa Command does not mean 
the U.S. military will take a leading role in 
African security matters, nor will it establish 
large U.S. troop bases.  Rather, Africa Command 
is a headquarters staff whose mission entails 
coordinating the kind of support that will enable 
African governments and existing regional 
organizations, such as the African Standby Force, 
to have greater capacity to provide security and 
respond in times of need.  Africa Command builds 
on the many African-U.S. security cooperation 
activities already underway, yet will be able to 
better coordinate DoD support with other U.S. 
government departments and agencies to make those 
activities even more effective.66 
The Chemical Corps has a substantial role to play in 
the future operations of the United States Africa Command 
beyond the Corps’ current mission set.  
A. FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Appendix B draws on only a single source, the CIA World 
Factbook, for its information.  More rigorous research would 
need to be done to substantiate the information presented, 
and to draw up a list of prioritized actions.   
                     
66 United States Africa Command, “About US AFRICOM,” Africom.mil, 
http://www.africom.mil/AboutAFRICOM.asp (accessed March 6, 2009). 
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Further study into each country’s resources and 
environmental damage can yield a more detailed list of 
nations that the Chemical Corps can assist.  Survey teams 
could be sent to each country to conduct joint research with 
the local military into what that particular country’s 
requirements would entail. 
There are issues that will factor into any assessment, 
such as: accessibility, feasibility, cost, manpower and 
equipment requirements, training levels and locations (e.g. 
should training be conducted primarily at Fort Leonard Wood 
at the CBRN Schoolhouse or would it be more beneficial to 
have MTTs in country?), etc.  These issues will vary both by 
country and by environmental region.   
Further research could also create a more comprehensive 
and detailed, even definitive database of traditional and 
non-traditional CBRNE events in Africa.  This database could 
be analyzed for trends that will assist in avoidance of and 
protection against future CBRNE events and potentially help 
African governments write policies to help protect their 
land and people from environmental degradation. 
Teams could pair CBRN experts with African military 
leaders to determine what the goals and priorities should be 
for each African country from Africans’ perspective.  This 
will ensure that AFRICOM meets the expectations of the 
African militaries and matches these to existing and 
practicable/realistic capabilities.  Given AFRICOM’s 
objectives for operations the Chemical Corps’ seems ideally 
poised to contribute its services and expertise. 
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If AFRICOM and the Chemical Corps work together both 
should be able to assist African countries in meaningful 
ways, for the greater good of not only Africans, but the 
world as a whole.  
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APPENDIX A 
A. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR (CBRN) 
HISTORICAL EVENTS IN AFRICA 
Below is a list of CBRN events dating between 1950 and 
2009.  Unfortunately, this list, while the most 
comprehensive currently available in open source media, is 
not complete.  For instance, throughout this period, 
radioactive material has gone missing:  “The petroleum 
industry is the main user of radioactive material in 
Nigeria.  The materials, which are in tools to detect cracks 
in pipelines and measure exploratory oil wells, have gone 
missing – or been stolen – in the past.”67 
1. Events from 1950-2009 
a. 1952 — Livestock Poisoning — Kenya 
The Mau Mau Uprising of 1952 to 1960 was an 
insurgency by Kenyan rebels (primarily from the Kikuyu 
tribe) against British colonial rule.  The British have 
alleged that throughout the insurgency the Mau Mau rebels 
frequently poisoned cattle as part of a larger effort to 
target livestock, principally using arsenic.  In 1952 alone, 
British authorities claimed that rebels used plant toxins to 
kill 33 steer at a mission station in the tribal area 
                     
67 Bashir Adigun, “Nigeria Can’t Adequately Store, Track its 
Radioactive Material, Says Country’s Nuclear Chief,” International 
Herald Tribune, July 26, 2007, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/26/africa/AF-GEN-Nigeria-
Nuclear.php?page=2 (accessed March 6, 2009). 
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reserved for the Kikuyu tribe.68  The symptoms the steer 
developed were synonymous with exposure to the African Milk 
Bush (aka Pencil Cactus).  The Milk Bush’s sap contains a 
vesicant69 that is irritating to the skin and toxic when 
ingested.  The steer developed large amounts of fluid inside 
their body cavities, which caused swelling and subsequently 
death. 
b. 1973 — Ammonia Leak — South Africa 
On 13 July 1973, a storage tank in Potchefstroom, 
South Africa, released 38 tons of ammonia into the local 
environment.  The liquid anhydrous ammonia was used as 
fertilizer and stored either at room temperature under 
pressure or at atmospheric pressure and maintained at 
subzero temperatures.  In this particular plant in South 
Africa, the ammonia was stored under pressure in four 50-ton 
horizontal cylinders.  One of the cylinders exploded while 
being filled from a rail car.  Eighteen people were killed 
during the explosion and subsequent gas cloud, and an 
additional 65 people were treated at a local hospital.70  
c. 1976-1980 — Biological Agents — Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique 
W. Seth Carus cites evidence suggesting that the 
Rhodesian government may have used biological agents against 
                     
68 W. Seth Carus, “Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of 
Biological Agents since 1900,” Fredonia Books, 2002, in Hamid Mohtadi 
and Antu Murshid, “A Global Chronology of Incidents of Chemical, 
Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005,” National Center 
for Food Protection and Defense, Jul. 7, 2006, 6. 
69 Vesicants are substances that cause tissue blistering. 
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the black civilian population in Rhodesia and Mozambique.  
Many of these accounts are based on interviews of former 
members of the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO).  It 
is alleged that the CIO recruited faculty members at the 
University of Rhodesia to help develop and test various 
biological agents on members of the black population in 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe.  In one incident in 1976, an 
unidentified bacteriological agent was used to contaminate 
boreholes, rivers, and water sources in Mozambique.  This 
incident corresponds with a cholera epidemic, which resulted 
in an unknown number of casualties.  In another incident, 
anthrax bacterium may have been introduced into rural areas 
of Western Zimbabwe.  This coincides with the worst-ever 
recorded outbreak of human anthrax, which resulted in 10,738 
documented cases and 182 deaths between 1979 and 1980.71  
The spike in the number of anthrax cases is certainly 
suspicious.  In the previous 30 years, there had only been 
334 reported cases overall among humans.  Moreover, the 
geographical pattern of the outbreak is unusual, in the 
sense that it was widespread, but at the same time confined 
                     
70 John Frederick Lancaster, Engineering Catastrophes: Causes and 
Effects of Major Accidents, 2nd Ed. (CRC, Abington Publishing, 2000), 
180-181. 
71 Hamid Mohtadi and Antu Murshid, “A Global Chronology of Incidents 
of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005,” 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Jul. 7, 2006, 6; Ian 
Martinez, “The History of the Use of Bacteriological and Chemical Agents 
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Third World Quarterly 23, no. 6 (2002): 1159-1179. 
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to Tribal Trust Lands.72  However, there is also speculation 
that the outbreak could have been derived from natural 
causes and not terrorism.  Most experts agree that the 
outbreak could be attributed to the breakdown of vaccination 
practices in the Tribal lands.  Moreover, the case for 
deliberate transmission of the disease is undermined given 
the sheer magnitude of the epidemic, which covered such a 
vast geographical region.73 
d. 1 Oct 1979 — Poison Gas — Libya 
In Tripoli, a high-ranking Fatah commander, Abu 
Khaled Sulayman, narrowly escaped serious injury after 
opening a letter containing poison gas.74 
e. 8 Jan 1982 — Explosives — South Africa 
On 8 January 1982, the 70th anniversary of the 
formation of the African National Congress, guerillas 
attacked the Koeberg nuclear power plant while it was still 
under construction.  Reports disagree about the munitions 
                     
72 M. Wheelis, 2003,. “A Short History of Biological Warfare and 
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of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005.” 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Jul. 7, 2006, 15. The 
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the mid-1970s to the mid-2000s. 
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used for the attack and most indicate that the attackers 
utilized bombs, mines, or SA-7 missiles.  The completion of 
the power plant was pushed back 18 months due to damage.75 
f. Aug 1989 — Biological Agents — Namibia 
There are several reports of an August 1989 attack 
on the water supply at Dobra, a refugee camp in Namibia, by 
the Civil Cooperation Bureau, South Africa’s covert Special 
Forces organization during the apartheid era.  The operative 
ordered to conduct the attack stated that he was given 
cholera and yellow fever organisms by a South African Army 
doctor, but the attack failed due to the high chlorine 
content in the water supply.76 
g. 17 Mar 1990 — Fire — Libya 
The Rabta “Technology Center” by late 1989 was 
producing a wide variety of chemical weapons, including 
blister and nerve agents.  In March 1990, U.S. intelligence 
sources indicated that a massive fire had occurred at the 
center leading to indefinite suspension of the production of 
all agents.  However, by May 1990 production had resumed.  
It is speculated that production of the agents had actually 
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76 Helen E. Purkitt and Stephen F. Burgess, South Africa’s Weapons of 
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hoax.  President Qaddafi accused the United States and other 
western nations of involvement in the fire.  No allegations 
were substantiated.77 
h. May/Jun 1999 — Tear Gas — South Africa 
There are several incidents regarding the use and 
theft of tear gas in mid-1999 in South Africa.  While tear 
gas is on the low-end of the scale with regard to chemical 
agents, it falls into the category of a riot control agent.  
It can be lethal in concentrated doses in closed quarters.  
In the South African cases in 1999, one involved the arrest 
of four men with 10 canisters of tear gas in their 
possession.  Another consisted of a white policeman spraying 
a black colleague with tear gas, and a third consisted of 
several boys stealing weapons to include tear gas from the 
police.78   
i. Jan 2000 — Acid — Nigeria 
Throughout the early 2000s there are scattered 
reports of acid being used as a weapon throughout Africa.  
Acid appears to have been the weapon of choice for the Odua 
People’s Congress of Nigeria.  The group had, on several 
occasions, used various acids in attacks on police officers 
and opposing factions.  The Odua People’s Congress, which 
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78 Gavin Cameron and others, “1999 WMD Terrorism Chronology: 
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represents Nigeria’s Yoruba ethnic group, had taken the lead 
in instigating violent ethnic eruptions in southwestern 
Nigeria.79 
j. 21 Feb 2000 — Poison — Nigeria 
In late February, riots broke out in the northern 
city of Kaduna in Nigeria.  These would be the first of many 
riots in reaction to the introduction of Sharia Law.  
Although Sharia Law was only supposed to apply to Muslims, 
Christians strongly opposed its introduction, for fear that 
the Sharia law and punishments would be applied to them 
also.  In states where Sharia Law had already been 
introduced, the sale and consumption of alcohol was 
prohibited and women were prohibited from traveling with men 
in public transport vehicles.  In Zamfara state where Sharia 
law was already in effect, amputations and floggings had 
already been imposed for such things as cattle theft and 
fornication.80  The Kaduna branch of the Christian 
Association of Nigeria (CAN) organized a public protest on 
February 21.81  Militant Muslim youths attacked and killed 
the Christian demonstrators who were protesting the 
government’s plans to implement Sharia Law in Kaduna, 
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Nigeria.  The militants killed some victims with poison 
arrows, and while the precise number of deaths from the 
arrows is unknown, at least 300 people died in the 
violence.82 
k. 17 March 2000 — Acid — Uganda 
On 17 March, reports emerged that 530 members of 
the Movement for the Restoration of the Ten Commandments of 
God Sect, burned to death in their church in Kanungu, 
Uganda.83  Initially it was not clear whether this was a 
mass suicide or whether the leader of the cult, Joseph 
Kibwetere, had lured members to their deaths.  Further, 
police investigation unearthed hundreds of bodies of people 
who had been poisoned, strangled, and/or stabbed.  The final 
death toll from the fire and the poisonings was 780, the 
majority from acid poisoning.84   
l. 19 May 2002 — Poison — Zimbabwe 
Seven members of the Johanne Marange Apostolic 
Church, a Christian fundamentalist group, died, and another 
47 were taken ill after drinking tea that had been poisoned 
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with pesticides.  The incident took place near the town of 
Nyazura, 190 kilometers east of Harare, Zimbabwe.85 
m. 25 November 2002 — Poison — South Africa 
A group of far right-wing whites planned to kill 
millions of black South Africans by poisoning the water 
supply of townships near Johannesburg, the South African 
National Intelligence Agency revealed in 2002.  The group 
also planned to destroy electricity and transport networks 
serving the same areas, and plotted to detonate bombs made 
from plastic explosives and other substances in the national 
parliament building in Cape Town.  The plan was to pour 
Tetranium, an agricultural poison, into several reservoirs 
in order to reach the approximately ten million victims.  
However, experts claim that the plot would have failed 
because of the large amount of chemicals needed.86 
n. 2002 — Poison — South Africa 
A white South African supremacist group, Boeremag, 
planned to poison black South Africans with poisoned oranges 
in late 2002.  This was part of a larger plan to overthrow 
the South African government in a coup, which included 
bombings of Johannesburg’s airport and stock exchange and 
                     
85 Hamid Mohtadi and Antu Murshid, “A Global Chronology of Incidents 
of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear Attacks: 1950-2005,” 
National Center for Food Protection and Defense, Jul. 7, 2006, 56-57; 
“Seven Members of a Religious Sect Die After Drinking Tea Suspected to 
Have Been Poisoned,” Human Rights Without Frontiers, May 24, 2002, 
http://www.hrwf.net/religiousfreedom/news/zimbabwe2002.html (accessed 
February 16, 2009). 
86 Basildon Peta, “Far Right in South Africa Foiled in Plot to Poison 
Water in Townships,” The Independent: World, November 25, 2002, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/far-right-in-south-
africa-foiled-in-plot-to-poison-water-in-townships-605316.html (accessed 
February 16, 2009). 
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seizure of radio stations and military bases.  It was called 
off in September 2002, when it became clear the police knew 
of the plan.87 
o. September 2002 — Leaking Fuel/Toxic 
Chemicals — South Africa 
In mid-September 2002, a freighter carrying toxic 
chemicals caught fire off the coast of South Africa and 
leaked over 1000 tons of fuel onto the coastline.  The cargo 
included 335,000 gallons of fuel oil, 80,000 gallons of 
gasoline and a variety of toxic chemicals including alpha-
naphthylamine, which can be particularly harmful to the 
environment.88  
p. September 2002 — Fire/Toxic Chemicals — 
Nigeria 
At least 45 workers died on the night of September 
15, 2002, during a fire at a Nigerian plastics factory.  The 
factory, West Africa Rubber Products Limited, owned by a 
conglomerate based in Shanghai and Hong Kong, was gutted by 
the fire.  Enormous quantities of toxic chemicals were 
released into the environment due to the fire.  The few 
surviving workers reported that when they tried to escape 
they found the factory doors locked, and they were trapped.  
Nigerian papers reported hundreds of deaths as scores of 
night shift workers remained missing.  There were additional 
                     
87 Michael Wines, “World Briefing | Africa: South Africa: Poison 
Fruit Plot Described,” The New York Times, August 12, 2004, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html (accessed February 16, 2009). 
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reports that some of the workers had been fired upon by 
security guards during their attempts to escape the fire; 
four were treated with gunshot wounds.89  
q. March 2003 — Radioactive Material — Nigeria 
The International Atomic Energy Agency sent an 
emergency mission to Nigeria to help find an undisclosed 
amount of missing or stolen radioactive material.  Nigeria 
asked for help after the material disappeared from an oil 
company in the southern Niger Delta region.90 
r. September 2003 — Cyanide Exposure — Tanzania  
In September 2003, an epidemic of spastic 
paraparesis was studied in a drought-affected rural area of 
Tanzania.  A very similar epidemic occurred in 1989 in the 
same area due to people being forced to subsist on a diet 
consisting almost exclusively of bitter cassava roots.  The 
drought increased the natural occurrence of cyanogenic 
glucosides in the roots, and the procedure to remove the 
cyanide before consumption was shortened thanks to the 
people’s hunger.  Similar outbreaks occurred in Mozambique 
and Zaire, where the disease was reported under the name 
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“konzo.”  The poisoning affects upper motor neurons and 
causes permanent paralysis in the sufferer’s legs.91 
                     
91 W.P. Howlett and others, “Konzo, an Epidemic Upper Motor Neuron 




Below is a sample list of major resources found in 
Africa and the associated environmental concerns for each 
country that the Chemical Corps has the ability, or could 
develop the ability, to help ameliorate.92 
• Algeria: petroleum, natural gas, iron ore, 
phosphates, uranium, lead, zinc 
Issues: soil erosion from overgrazing and other 
poor farming practices; desertification; dumping 
of raw sewage, petroleum refining wastes, and 
other industrial effluents are leading to the 
pollution of rivers and coastal waters; the 
Mediterranean Sea, in particular, is becoming 
polluted from oil wastes, soil erosion, and 
fertilizer runoff; inadequate supplies of potable 
water 
• Angola: petroleum, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, 
copper, feldspar, gold, bauxite, uranium 
Issues: overuse of pastures and subsequent soil 
erosion attributable to population pressures; 
desertification; deforestation of tropical rain 
forest, in response to both international demand 
for tropical timber and domestic use as fuel, 
resulting in loss of biodiversity; soil erosion 
contributing to water pollution and siltation of 
rivers and dams; inadequate supplies of potable 
water 
• Benin: small offshore oil deposits, limestone, 
marble, timber 
Issues: inadequate supplies of potable water; 
poaching threatens wildlife populations; 
deforestation; desertification 
 
                     
92 CIA, The World Factbook (2009), 
https://cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bn.html#Geo 
(accessed March 14, 2009). 
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• Botswana: diamonds, copper, nickel, salt, soda 
ash, potash, coal, iron ore, silver  
Issues: overgrazing; desertification; limited 
fresh water resources 
• Burkina Faso: manganese, limestone, marble; small 
deposits of gold, phosphates, pumice, salt 
Issues: recent droughts and desertification are 
severely affecting agricultural activities, 
population distribution, and the economy; 
overgrazing; soil degradation; deforestation 
• Burundi: nickel, uranium, rare earth oxides, peat, 
cobalt, copper, platinum, vanadium, arable land, 
hydropower, niobium, tantalum, gold, tin, 
tungsten, kaolin, limestone 
Issues: flooding; landslides; drought; soil 
erosion as a result of overgrazing and the 
expansion of agriculture onto marginal lands; 
deforestation (little forested land remains 
because of uncontrolled cutting of trees for 
fuel); habitat loss threatens wildlife populations 
• Cameroon: petroleum, bauxite, iron ore, timber, 
hydropower 
Issues: waterborne diseases are prevalent; 
deforestation; overgrazing; desertification; 
poaching; overfishing 
• Cape Verde: salt, basalt rock, limestone, kaolin, 
fish, clay, gypsum 
Issues: prolonged droughts; seasonal harmattan 
wind produces obscuring dust; volcanically and 
seismic activity; soil erosion; deforestation due 
to demand for wood used as fuel; water shortages; 
desertification; environmental damage threatens 
several species of birds and reptiles; illegal 
beach sand extraction; overfishing 
• Central African Republic: diamonds, uranium, 
timber, gold, oil, hydropower  
Issues: tap water is not potable; poaching has 
diminished the country's reputation as one of the 
last great wildlife refuges; desertification; 
deforestation 
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• Chad: petroleum, uranium, natron, kaolin, fish 
(Lake Chad), gold, limestone, sand and gravel, 
salt 
Issues: periodic droughts; locust plagues; 
inadequate supplies of potable water; improper 
waste disposal in rural areas contributes to soil 
and water pollution; desertification 
• Comoros: negligible 
Issues: cyclones possible during rainy season 
(December to April); Le Karthala on Grand Comore 
is an active volcano; soil degradation and erosion 
results from crop cultivation on slopes without 
proper terracing; deforestation 
• Congo, Democratic Republic of the: cobalt, copper, 
niobium, tantalum, petroleum, industrial and gem 
diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, 
uranium, coal, hydropower, timber  
Issues: periodic droughts in the south; Congo 
River floods (seasonal); active volcanoes in the 
Great Rift Valley in the east; poaching threatens 
wildlife populations; water pollution; 
deforestation; refugees responsible for 
significant deforestation, soil erosion; mining of 
minerals (coltan - a mineral used in creating 
capacitors, diamonds, and gold) is causing 
environmental damage 
• Congo, Republic of the (Zaire): petroleum, timber, 
potash, lead, zinc, uranium, copper, phosphates, 
gold, magnesium, natural gas, hydropower  
Issues: seasonal flooding; air pollution from 
vehicle emissions; water pollution from the 
dumping of raw sewage; tap water is not potable; 
deforestation   
• Cote d’Ivoire: petroleum, natural gas, diamonds, 
manganese, iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, copper, 
gold, nickel, tantalum, silica sand, clay, cocoa 
beans, coffee, palm oil, hydropower 
Issues: during the rainy season torrential 
flooding is possible; deforestation (most of the 
country's forests, once the largest in West 
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Africa, have been heavily logged); water pollution 
from sewage and industrial and agricultural 
effluents 
• Djibouti: geothermal areas, gold, clay, granite, 
limestone, marble, salt, diatomite, gypsum, 
pumice, petroleum 
Issues: earthquakes; droughts; occasional cyclonic 
disturbances from the Indian Ocean bring heavy 
rains and flash floods; inadequate supplies of 
potable water; limited arable land; 
desertification; endangered species 
• Egypt: Currently, Egypt is still considered to be 
part of CENTCOM’s Area of Focus due to the 
similarities between the people and cultures, it 
is not part of AFRICOM.  
• Equatorial Guinea: petroleum, natural gas, timber, 
gold, bauxite, diamonds, tantalum, sand and 
gravel, clay  
Issues: violent windstorms; flash floods; tap 
water is not potable; deforestation 
• Eritrea: gold, potash, zinc, copper, salt, 
possibly oil and natural gas, fish 
Issues: frequent droughts; locust swarms; 
deforestation; desertification; soil erosion; 
overgrazing; loss of infrastructure from civil 
warfare 
• Ethiopia: small reserves of gold, platinum, 
copper, potash, natural gas, hydropower 
Issues: geologically active Great Rift Valley 
susceptible to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions; 
frequent droughts; deforestation; overgrazing; 
soil erosion; desertification; water shortages in 
some areas from water-intensive farming and poor 
management   
• Gabon: petroleum, natural gas, diamond, niobium, 
manganese, uranium, gold, timber, iron ore, 
hydropower  
Issues: deforestation; poaching 
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• Gambia, The: fish, titanium (rutile and ilmenite), 
tin, zircon, silica sand, clay, petroleum  
Issues:  drought (rainfall has dropped by 30% in 
the last 30 years); deforestation; 
desertification; water-borne diseases prevalent 
• Ghana: gold, timber, industrial diamonds, bauxite, 
manganese, fish, rubber, hydropower, petroleum, 
silver, salt, limestone 
Issues: recurrent drought in north severely 
affects agricultural activities; deforestation; 
overgrazing; soil erosion; poaching and habitat 
destruction threatens wildlife populations; water 
pollution; inadequate supplies of potable water 
• Guinea: bauxite, iron ore, diamonds, gold, 
uranium, hydropower, fish, salt 
Issues: deforestation; inadequate supplies of 
potable water; desertification; soil contamination 
and erosion; overfishing, overpopulation in forest 
region; poor mining practices have led to 
environmental damage 
• Guinea Bissau: fish, timber, phosphates, bauxite, 
clay, granite, limestone, unexploited deposits of 
petroleum 
Issues: brush fires; deforestation; soil erosion; 
overgrazing; overfishing 
• Kenya: limestone, soda ash, salt, gemstones, 
fluorspar, zinc, diatomite, gypsum, wildlife, 
hydropower 
Issues: recurring drought; flooding during rainy 
seasons; water pollution from urban and industrial 
wastes; degradation of water quality from 
increased use of pesticides and fertilizers; water 
hyacinth infestation in Lake Victoria; 
deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; 
poaching 
• Lesotho: water, agricultural and grazing land, 
diamonds, sand, clay, building stone 
Issues: periodic droughts; population pressure is 
forcing settlement in marginal areas resulting in 
overgrazing, severe soil erosion, and soil 
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exhaustion; desertification; Highlands Water 
Project controls, stores, and redirects water to 
South Africa 
• Liberia: iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, 
hydropower  
Issues: tropical rain forest deforestation; soil 
erosion; loss of biodiversity; pollution of 
coastal waters from oil residue and raw sewage 
• Libya: petroleum, natural gas, gypsum 
Issues: dust storms; sand storms; desertification; 
limited natural fresh water resources; the Great 
Manmade River Project, the largest water 
development scheme in the world, is being built to 
bring water from large aquifers under the Sahara 
to coastal cities 
• Madagascar: graphite, chromite, coal, bauxite, 
salt, quartz, tar sands, semiprecious stones, 
mica, fish, hydropower 
Issues: periodic cyclones, drought, and locust 
infestations; soil erosion results from 
deforestation and overgrazing; desertification; 
surface water contaminated with raw sewage and 
other organic wastes; several endangered species 
of flora and fauna unique to the island 
• Malawi: limestone, arable land, hydropower, 
unexploited deposits of uranium, coal, and bauxite 
Issues: deforestation; land degradation; water 
pollution from agricultural runoff, sewage, 
industrial wastes; siltation of spawning grounds 
endangers fish populations (Lake Malawi) 
• Mali: gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, 
uranium, gypsum, granite, hydropower  
note: bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and 
copper deposits are known but not exploited 
Issues: recurring droughts; occasional Niger River 
flooding; deforestation; soil erosion; 




• Mauritania: iron ore, gypsum, copper, phosphate, 
diamonds, gold, oil, fish 
Issues: periodic droughts; overgrazing, 
deforestation, and soil erosion aggravated by 
drought are contributing to desertification; 
limited natural fresh water resources away from 
the Senegal, which is the only perennial river; 
locust infestations 
• Mauritius: arable land, fish 
Issues: cyclones; water pollution, degradation of 
coral reefs 
• Morocco: phosphates, iron ore, manganese, lead, 
zinc, fish, salt 
Issues: northern mountains geologically unstable 
and subject to earthquakes; periodic droughts; 
land degradation/desertification (soil erosion 
resulting from farming of marginal areas, 
overgrazing, destruction of vegetation); water 
supplies contaminated by raw sewage; siltation of 
reservoirs; oil pollution of coastal waters 
• Mozambique: coal, titanium, natural gas, 
hydropower, tantalum, graphite 
Issues: severe droughts; devastating cyclones and 
floods in central and southern provinces; a long 
civil war and recurrent drought in the hinterlands 
have resulted in increased migration of the 
population to urban and coastal areas with adverse 
environmental consequences; desertification; 
pollution of surface and coastal waters; poaching 
of elephants for ivory  
• Namibia: diamonds, copper, uranium, gold, silver, 
lead, tin, lithium, cadmium, tungsten, zinc, salt, 
hydropower, fish  note: suspected deposits of oil, 
coal, and iron ore 
Issues: prolonged periods of drought; limited 
natural fresh water resources; desertification; 
wildlife poaching; land degradation has led to 
pressure on conservation areas 
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• Niger: uranium, coal, iron ore, tin, phosphates, 
gold, molybdenum, gypsum, salt, petroleum 
Issues: recurring droughts; overgrazing; soil 
erosion; deforestation; desertification; wildlife 
populations (such as elephant, hippopotamus, 
giraffe, and lion) threatened because of poaching 
and habitat destruction 
• Nigeria: natural gas, petroleum, tin, iron ore, 
coal, limestone, niobium, lead, zinc, arable land  
Issues: periodic droughts; flooding; soil 
degradation; rapid deforestation; urban air and 
water pollution; desertification; oil pollution - 
water, air, and soil; has suffered serious damage 
from oil spills; loss of arable land; rapid 
urbanization 
• Rwanda: gold, cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite 
(tungsten ore), methane, hydropower, arable land 
Issues: periodic droughts; volcanic activity in 
the Virunga mountains along the border with the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo; deforestation 
results from uncontrolled cutting of trees for 
fuel; overgrazing; soil exhaustion; soil erosion; 
widespread poaching 
• Sao Tome and Principe: fish, hydropower 
Issues: deforestation; soil erosion and exhaustion 
• Senegal: fish, phosphates, iron ore 
Issues: lowlands seasonally flooded; periodic 
droughts; wildlife populations threatened by 
poaching; deforestation; overgrazing; soil 
erosion; desertification; overfishing 
• Seychelles: fish, copra, cinnamon trees 
Issues: short droughts possible; water supply 
depends on catchments to collect rainwater 
• Sierra Leone: diamonds, titanium ore, bauxite, 
iron ore, gold, chromite 
Issues: sandstorms, dust storms; rapid population 
growth pressuring the environment; overharvesting 
of timber, expansion of cattle grazing, and slash-
and-burn agriculture have resulted in 
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deforestation and soil exhaustion; civil war has 
depleted natural resources; overfishing 
• Somalia: uranium and largely unexploited reserves 
of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt, 
natural gas, likely oil reserves 
Issues: recurring droughts; frequent dust storms 
over eastern plains in summer; floods during rainy 
season; famine; use of contaminated water 
contributes to human health problems; 
deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; 
desertification 
• South Africa: gold, chromium, antimony, coal, iron 
ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, tin, uranium, 
gem diamonds, platinum, copper, vanadium, salt, 
natural gas 
Issues: prolonged droughts; lack of important 
arterial rivers or lakes requires extensive water 
conservation and control measures; growth in water 
usage is outpacing supply; pollution of rivers 
from agricultural runoff and urban discharge; air 
pollution resulting in acid rain; soil erosion; 
desertification 
• Sudan: petroleum; small reserves of iron ore, 
copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, 
silver, gold, hydropower 
Issues: dust storms and periodic persistent 
droughts; inadequate supplies of potable water; 
wildlife populations threatened by excessive 
hunting; soil erosion; desertification 
• Swaziland: asbestos, coal, clay, cassiterite, 
hydropower, forests, small gold and diamond 
deposits, quarry stone, and talc 
Issues: drought; limited supplies of potable 
water; wildlife populations being depleted because 
of excessive hunting; overgrazing; soil 
degradation; soil erosion 
• Tanzania: hydropower, tin, phosphates, iron ore, 
coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, natural gas, 
nickel 
Issues: flooding on the central plateau during the 
rainy season; drought; soil degradation; 
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deforestation; desertification; destruction of 
coral reefs threatens marine habitats; recent 
droughts are affecting marginal agriculture; 
wildlife is threatened by illegal hunting and 
trade, especially for ivory 
 
• Togo: phosphates, limestone, marble, arable land 
Issues: periodic droughts; deforestation 
attributable to slash-and-burn agriculture and the 
use of wood for fuel; water pollution presents 
health hazards and hinders the fishing industry; 
air pollution is increasing in urban areas 
• Tunisia: petroleum, phosphates, iron ore, lead, 
zinc, salt 
Issues: toxic and hazardous waste disposal are 
ineffective and pose health risks; water pollution 
from raw sewage; limited natural fresh water 
resources; deforestation; overgrazing; soil 
erosion; desertification 
• Uganda: copper, cobalt, hydropower, limestone, 
salt, arable land 
Issues: draining of wetlands for agricultural use; 
deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; water 
hyacinth infestation in Lake Victoria; widespread 
poaching 
• Western Sahara: phosphates, iron ore 
Issues: hot, dry, dust/sand-laden sirocco wind can 
occur during winter and spring; widespread 
harmattan haze exists 60% of time, often severely 
restricting visibility; sparse water and lack of 
arable land 
• Zambia: copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, 
emeralds, gold, silver, uranium, hydropower 
Issues: periodic drought, tropical storms; air 
pollution and resulting acid rain in the mineral 
extraction and refining region; chemical runoff 
into watersheds; poaching seriously threatens 
rhinoceros, elephant, antelope, and large cat 
populations; deforestation; soil erosion; 
desertification; lack of adequate water treatment 
presents human health risks 
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• Zimbabwe: coal, chromium ore, asbestos, gold, 
nickel, copper, iron ore, vanadium, lithium, tin, 
platinum group metals 
Issues: recurring droughts; deforestation; soil 
erosion; land degradation; air and water 
pollution; the black rhinoceros herd—once the 
largest concentration of the species in the world 
—has been significantly reduced by poaching; poor 
mining practices have led to toxic waste and heavy 
metal pollution 
 72
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